Seeing the No-Compelled-Speech Doctrine Clearly through the Lens of \u3ci\u3eTelescope Media\u3c/i\u3e by Duncan, Richard F.
Nebraska Law Review 
Volume 99 Issue 1 Article 4 
2020 
Seeing the No-Compelled-Speech Doctrine Clearly through the 
Lens of Telescope Media 
Richard F. Duncan 
University of Nebraska College of Law, rduncan2@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr 
Recommended Citation 
Richard F. Duncan, Seeing the No-Compelled-Speech Doctrine Clearly through the Lens of Telescope 
Media, 99 Neb. L. Rev. 58 (2020) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol99/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Richard F. Duncan*
Seeing the No-Compelled-Speech
Doctrine Clearly Through the Lens
of Telescope Media
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
II. The No-Compelled-Speech Doctrine: A Summary of the
Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
A. Justice Jackson’s Iconic Opinion in Barnette . . . . . . . 61
B. Wooley and Libertarian Authoritarianism . . . . . . . . . . 62
C. When Government Treats Speech as a Public
Accommodation: Hurley’s Unanimous Decision . . . . . 64
D. Justice Kennedy Reaches Across Time to Unite with
Justice Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
III. A Careful Reading of Telescope Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A. Stras Versus Kelly: Regulation of Speech or
Conduct? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
B. Stras Versus Kelly: Content-Neutral or Content-
Based Law? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
C. Stras Versus Kelly: Strict Scrutiny/Compelling
Interest Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
IV. Defending the Reasoning of Telescope Media’s
Compelled Speech Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
A. The No-Compelled-Speech Doctrine Applies when
“A” Is Compelled to Speak, Create, or Help
Disseminate the Message of “B” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
B. Compelled Speech Under Public Accommodation
Laws Is Usually Viewpoint-Based, and Certainly
Not Content-Neutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a
response to this Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* Sherman S. Welpton, Jr. Professor of Law and Warren R. Wise Professor of Law,
University of Nebraska College of Law. This Article is dedicated to the memory of
my wonderful friend and colleague, Professor Marty Gardner. Marty was an ex-
ceptional teacher and scholar, and he was a wonderful mentor to decades of stu-
dents at the University of Nebraska College of Law. He is missed by everyone in
our community.
58
2020] TELESCOPE MEDIA 59
C. Herein of Compelling Interests and Relative
Harms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
D. The Race Analogy Does Not Apply to Wedding
Vendors and Compelled Speech Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
I. INTRODUCTION
It is better to have too much freedom of speech than too little. Free-
dom of thought, belief, and speech are fundamental to the dignity of
the human person. When the law strikes at free speech it hits human
dignity—the right of a person to express what he believes to be true.
What is even worse, when the law compels a person to say that which
he believes to be untrue, the blade cuts deeper because it requires the
person to be untrue to himself, perhaps even untrue to God.
We live in an era of increasing instances in which government com-
pels persons to say things they believe are untrue or are contrary to
their religious conscience. For example, in recent years government
has required: (1) pro-life pregnancy centers to provide clients with in-
formation about how to obtain “free or low-cost” abortions;1 (2) a wed-
ding cake artist to create wedding cakes celebrating same-sex
weddings;2 (3) a florist to create floral arrangements celebrating
same-sex weddings;3 (4) a wedding photographer to take photographs
of same-sex weddings;4 (5) calligraphers to create wedding invitations
for same-sex weddings;5 and (6) a printing and graphic design busi-
ness to print t-shirts celebrating a local gay pride festival.6
Although the Supreme Court has a long history of protecting per-
sons against laws compelling speech,7 until recently expressive wed-
ding vendors have been denied this protection.8 However, the
1. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (2018).
2. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
3. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct.
2671 (2018). On remand, the Washington Supreme Court again ruled against the
florist. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019).
4. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
5. Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019).
6. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Human Rights Comm’n v. Hands On Originals,
592 S.W.3d 291 (Ky. 2019).
7. See Richard F. Duncan, Defense Against the Dark Arts: Justice Jackson, Justice






Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355 (2018).
8. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC, 309 P.3d 53; State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc.,
441 P.3d 1203; see also Douglas Laycock, The Broader Implications of Master-
60 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:58
prevailing winds have started to shift, and cake artists,9 vide-
ographers,10 and wedding-invitation artists11 all have prevailed
against compelled speech requirements in the last two years.
The purpose of this Article is to take a close look at what has be-
come the leading case on the right of expressive wedding vendors to
resist speech compulsions—the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Telescope
Media Group v. Lucero.12 First, I will briefly describe the Court’s long-
standing doctrine protecting persons against compelled speech re-
quirements. I will then take a careful look at the holding and
reasoning of Telescope Media. Finally, I will suggest that Judge
Stras’s majority opinion in Telescope Media is very persuasive and
that the arguments against applying the no-compelled-speech doctrine
to commercial wedding vendors are not persuasive.
II. THE NO-COMPELLED-SPEECH DOCTRINE: A SUMMARY
OF THE SUPREME COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE
Compelled speech is unconstitutional. Of this there can be no
doubt.13 In an earlier work, I stated the Court’s no-compelled-speech
rule as follows: “[U]nder the Free Speech Clause government may not
compel a person to express or disseminate any belief, creed, or state-
ment of values, whether it is the government’s own message or the
message of a third-party.”14 Or, in the words of one of the leading
First Amendment scholars, Professor Eugene Volokh, “Government
coercion is presumptively unconstitutional . . . when it compels people
to speak things they do not want to speak.”15
Although there are numerous Supreme Court cases focusing on the
no-compelled-speech doctrine in many different contexts,16 in this sec-
tion of this Article I will focus on what I consider to be the canon of the
piece Cakeshop, 2019 BYU L. REV. 167, 180 (2019) (noting various cases where
such religious claimaints were unsuccessful).
9. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
(concluding that wedding cake artist prevailed under Free Exercise Clause; the
Court did not decide compelled speech claim).
10. Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019).
11. Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019) (adjudicat-
ing dispute brought by business that designs custom wedding invitations, includ-
ing hand-drawn images and calligraphy).
12. 936 F.3d 740.
13. See generally Duncan, supra note 7 (manuscript at 23) (“Under the no-compelled-
speech doctrine, no schoolchild, no automobile owner, no parade organizer, no
artist, and no individual may be compelled to say that which they do not think.”);
Volokh, supra note 7, at 355 (“Speech compulsions, the Court has often held, are
as constitutionally suspect as are speech restrictions . . . .”).
14. Duncan, supra note 7 (manuscript at 11).
15. Volokh, supra note 7, at 368.
16. Professor Volokh’s article does an excellent job of collecting the cases. See Volokh,
supra note 7.
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Court’s jurisprudence of compelled speech: West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette,17 Wooley v. Maynard,18 Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,19 and NationaI
Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA).20
A. Justice Jackson’s Iconic Opinion in Barnette
Although Barnette is often referred to as the Court’s “flag salute”
decision, it is actually the Court’s second flag salute decision. The
first, Minersville School District v. Gobitis,21 was an 8–1 decision
which held that it was constitutional for a public school to expel stu-
dents who refused to salute the flag based upon their sincerely held
religious beliefs.22 Gobitis was decided under the Free Exercise
Clause, not the Free Speech Clause.23 Less than three years after the
decision in Gobitis, the Court decided an almost identical case—one
involving Jehovah’s Witness schoolchildren expelled from public
school for conscientiously refusing to salute the flag24—but this time
the Court focused on the free speech rights of all students, not merely
the free exercise rights of religiously-motivated students.25
In one of the most lyrical and powerful opinions ever handed down
by any court, Justice Jackson made it clear that the right of free
speech includes the right not to be compelled to speak. “To sustain the
compulsory flag salute,” said Justice Jackson, “we are required to say
that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak his
own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter
what is not in his mind.”26 Jackson’s justification for the no-com-
pelled-speech doctrine was the overriding importance of “intellectual
individualism” and the right to resist “[c]ompulsory unification of
opinion.”27 Jackson denounced “village tyrants”28 who wish to “coerce
17. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
18. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
19. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
20. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). Much of the discussion of these cases is a summary of my
earlier work on compelled speech jurisprudence. See generally Duncan, supra
note 7.
21. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
22. Id. Although religious students had a right to believe that it was sinful to bow
down before any image other than God, the Constitution does not “compel exemp-
tion from doing what society thinks necessary for the promotion of some great
common end.” Id. at 593. See also Duncan, supra note 7 (manuscript at 2–5) (pro-
viding further explanation of the decision in Gobitis).
23. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594.
24. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629–30. For an excellent
“close reading” of Barnette, see Paul Horwitz, A Close Reading of Barnette, in
Honor of Vincent Blasi, 13 FIU L. REV. 689 (2019).
25. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634–35.
26. Id. at 634.
27. Id. at 641.
62 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:58
uniformity of sentiment”29 and composed a powerful manifesto
against authoritarian government that is as relevant in 2020 as it was
in 1943:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nation-
alism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word
or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an ex-
ception, they do not now occur to us.
We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute
and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades
the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amend-
ment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.30
Thus, for the government to compel schoolchildren to salute the
flag is tyrannical and even worse than compelled silence because it
invades the private space of one’s mind and beliefs.31 As Professor
Robert George has said: “Ordinary authoritarians are content to forbid
people from saying things they know or believe to be true. Totalitari-
ans insist on forcing people to say things they know or believe to be
untrue.”32
So was born the no-compelled-speech doctrine which protects the
right not to speak from authoritarian government and village tyrants.
Every age has its village tyrants, and our age seems to have more
than its fair share. Thus, Barnette and its progeny may be more im-
portant today than ever before.
B. Wooley and Libertarian Authoritarianism
Although it was once possible to read Barnette as only prohibiting
government from compelling affirmations of belief, such as by saluting
the flag, it soon became clear that the no-compelled-speech doctrine
also forbids government from compelling the dissemination of un-
wanted expression. Thus, under the Free Speech Clause, government
may not compel a person to express or disseminate any belief, creed,
or statement of values, whether it is the government’s own message or
the message of a third-party.33
In 1977, forty-four years after its decision in Barnette, the Supreme
Court decided Wooley v. Maynard.34 The facts of Wooley tell an amaz-
28. Id. at 638.
29. Id. at 640.
30. Id. at 642.
31. Id. at 633 (“It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only
on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence.”).
32. Robert P. George, FACEBOOK (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/
RobertPGeorge/posts/10155417655377906 [https://perma.unl.edu/HQS5-VR2M].
I have developed these points in more depth in an earlier article. See Duncan,
supra note 7 (manuscript at 8–9).
33. See Duncan, supra note 7 (manuscript at 10–11).
34. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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ing story that demonstrates that even libertarians can become tyran-
nical in pursuit of liberty.
The State of New Hampshire adopted a wonderful state motto
(“Live Free or Die”), placed this libertarian motto on its automobile
license plates, and, ironically, made it a misdemeanor for an automo-
bile owner to knowingly obscure “the figures or letters on any number
plate.”35 George Maynard and his wife Maxine were Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses who considered the motto “repugnant to their moral, religious,
and political beliefs.”36 In order to avoid displaying this ideological
message on their license plates, the Maynards covered the motto with
tape, and the state of New Hampshire prosecuted Mr. Maynard for
obscuring the motto on his license plate. He actually served a brief
sentence in jail for acting upon, rather than displaying, the “live free”
creed.37
The Court held that New Hampshire violated the First Amend-
ment by compelling “an individual to participate in the dissemination
of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property.”38
Importantly, Wooley makes clear that the no-compelled-speech doc-
trine does not require an individual to speak any words, affirm any
beliefs, or create or compose any expressive message. In Wooley, it was
sufficient that New Hampshire required Mr. Maynard to act as a “mo-
bile billboard” for the state’s ideological motto “[a]s a condition to driv-
ing an automobile—a virtual necessity for most Americans.”39
Moreover, focusing on the First Amendment’s protection of “ ‘indi-
vidual freedom of the mind,” the Court stated the no-compelled-speech
rule in the strongest possible way:
We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected
by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. A system which secures
the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also
guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts.40
The significance of Wooley is that it makes clear that the landmark
doctrine of Barnette protects an individual’s intellectual autonomy not
merely from compelled affirmations of belief, but also from attempts
by the State to compel an individual to speak or even to help dissemi-
nate any religious, political, or ideological creed.41 If Barnette is the
lyrical genesis of the no-compelled-speech doctrine, Wooley is its rock-
solid realization. Taken together, Barnette and Wooley clearly estab-
lish that under the Free Speech Clause government has no legitimate
35. Id. at 707.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 708.
38. Id. at 713.
39. Id. at 715.
40. Id. at 714 (citations omitted).
41. See Duncan, supra note 7 (manuscript at 13).
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power to compel a person to speak, compose, create, or disseminate a
message on any matter of political, ideological, religious, or public
concern.
C. When Government Treats Speech as a Public
Accommodation: Hurley’s Unanimous Decision
In Hurley, the Court held that the no-compelled-speech doctrine
applies even in the context of a generally applicable public accommo-
dations law forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion.42 In this case, an assembly known as “GLIB,” a group “of gay,
lesbian, and bisexual descendants of the Irish immigrants,” wished to
march in the Boston St. Patrick’s Day Parade in order “to express
pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual indi-
viduals.”43 When the private sponsors of the St. Patrick’s Day Parade
refused to allow GLIB to march as a group in the parade, GLIB sued
to enforce the public accommodations law. The state trial court held
that the St. Patrick’s Day Parade was a place of public accommodation
under the law and that the parade sponsors’ decision to ban GLIB be-
cause of “its values and its message” was illegal discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation.44
Remarkably, this trial judge asserted that rejection of the values
and message of a group constitutes discrimination on the basis of the
innate personhood of the group’s members. Apparently, the good judge
believed that discrimination against the message is, without more,
discrimination against the person. This is seriously wrong. Under the
Free Speech Clause and the no-compelled-speech doctrine, this confla-
tion of message with messenger should be rejected because a speaker’s
objection to speaking or disseminating a particular ideological mes-
sage is at the core of the no-compelled-speech doctrine. Speaker auton-
omy inherently permits a speaker to discriminate in favor of
viewpoints he wishes to express and against viewpoints he wishes not
to express. Discrimination among content and viewpoints is what
speakers do and must be allowed to do.
Although the State argued that the public accommodations law
was a content-neutral regulation of discrimination in the marketplace
for goods and services (including recreational services such as holiday
parades), the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that the Mas-
sachusetts public accommodations law, although facially targeting
only discriminatory conduct, not speech, “has been applied in a pecu-
liar way”45 because the “state courts’ application of the statute had
42. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
43. Id. at 561.
44. Id. at 561–62.
45. Id. at 572.
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the effect of declaring the [parade] sponsors’ speech itself to be the
public accommodation.”46 Thus, Justice Souter’s unanimous opinion
in Hurley declared that the state court order violated “the fundamen-
tal rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has
the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”47
The rule of Hurley is this: a public accommodations law unconsti-
tutionally compels speech when it treats speech as a public accommo-
dation. Justice Souter’s unanimous opinion also makes clear that the
First Amendment protects one private individual from being com-
pelled by law to express, convey, or help disseminate the political, ide-
ological, or social ideas of another private individual. Hurley is of
fundamental importance to speaker autonomy, no less today than
when it was decided.
D. Justice Kennedy Reaches Across Time to Unite with
Justice Jackson
Seventy-five years after Justice Jackson’s landmark opinion on
compelled speech in Barnette, Justice Kennedy penned an equally
strong libertarian manifesto in his concurring opinion in NIFLA.48 In
NIFLA, the State of California had compelled pro-life crisis pregnancy
centers to provide certain “government-drafted” notices to their clients
and in their advertisements.49 For example, licensed pro-life clinics
were required to “notify women that California provides free or low-
cost services, including abortions” and provide a phone number to
learn more about those services.50 The Court, in a majority opinion
written by Justice Thomas, held that this compelled expression was
an unconstitutional “content-based regulation of speech.”51
But the most interesting opinion by far in NIFLA is Justice Ken-
nedy’s concurrence. In a powerful opinion echoing Justice Jackson in
Barnette, Justice Kennedy made clear that although he joined the ma-
jority opinion “in all respects,” he was writing a separate opinion to
make an even stronger case against California’s compelled speech
law.52
First, Kennedy observed that California’s compelled speech law
was not merely a content-based regulation of speech; rather, the Cali-
fornia law constituted “viewpoint discrimination” and served as “a
46. Id. at 573.
47. Id.
48. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion was joined by
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and Justice Gorsuch. Id.
49. Id. at 2369 (majority opinion).
50. Id. at 2368.
51. Id. at 2371.
52. Id. at 2378 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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paradigmatic example of the serious threat presented when govern-
ment seeks to impose its own message in the place of individual
speech, thought, and expression.”53 Second, Justice Kennedy force-
fully denounced the California law as a deplorable and tyrannical ex-
ample of authoritarian government.
Justice Kennedy described the compelled speech law as one in
which California had required pro-life crisis pregnancy centers to dis-
seminate and promote the state’s message “advertising abortions” and
thereby “to contradict their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded
in basic philosophical, ethical, or religious precepts.”54 But what
makes this opinion reminiscent of Justice Jackson’s masterpiece in
Barnette is Kennedy’s response to the self-congratulatory statement
by the California Legislature that “the Act was part of California’s leg-
acy of ‘forward thinking.’”55 Justice Kennedy observed that it is not
“forward thinking” to compel ideological uniformity and continued:
It is forward thinking to begin by reading the First Amendment as ratified in
1791; to understand the history of authoritarian government as the Founders
then knew it; to confirm that history since then shows how relentless authori-
tarian regimes are in their attempts to stifle free speech; and to carry those
lessons onward as we seek to preserve and teach the necessity of freedom of
speech for the generations to come. Governments must not be allowed to force
persons to express a message contrary to their deepest convictions. Freedom
of speech secures freedom of thought and belief. This law imperils those
liberties.56
We live in an era in which compelled speech is becoming common-
place—especially in cases involving wedding photographers, printers,
cake artists, and florists—and Justice Kennedy, in one of his last opin-
ions as a member of the Court, wrote to help us resist authoritarian
government and tyrannical speech compulsions. And perhaps—just
perhaps—the spirit of Justice Kennedy’s disdain for laws compelling
speech is beginning to find traction. This seems to help explain the
Eighth Circuit’s recent decision in Telescope Media.
III. A CAREFUL READING OF TELESCOPE MEDIA
In his majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges,57 the decision in
which the Court created a constitutional right to same-sex marriage,
Justice Kennedy reassured those who believe in traditional marriage
that their beliefs would continue to be respected and protected. “Many
who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong,” said Justice Kennedy,
“reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or
philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are dispar-




57. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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aged here.”58 In even further reassuring dictum, Justice Kennedy con-
tinued: “The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations
and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the prin-
ciples that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and
to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they
have long revered.”59 If those comforting words were sincere, then
surely they apply to Carl and Angel Larsen, the professional film-
makers who own and operate Telescope Media Group.
Carl and Angel Larsen are filmmakers and storytellers. They are
also devout Christians who “aim to glorify God in everything they do,”
including in their work as filmmakers.60 Although the Larsens are in
business to make films for their clients, they maintain “creative con-
trol over the videos they produce,”61 over which events to make films
about, and what audio and video content to use.62 Moreover, although
they happily serve all persons without regard to race, gender, religion,
or sexual orientation, they “decline any requests for their services that
conflict with their religious beliefs.”63 Thus, their religious conscience
precludes them from making films with messages that are inconsis-
tent with “ ‘biblical truth,’” such as those that “ ‘promote sexual immo-
rality; support the destruction of unborn children; promote racism or
racial division; incite violence; degrade women; or promote any con-
ception of marriage other than as a lifelong institution between one
man and one woman.’”64 In other words, it is indisputable that the
Larsens’ “decisions on whether to create a specific film never focus on
who the client is, but on what message or event the film will promote
or celebrate.”65
This litigation arose when the Larsens decided they would like to
expand their filmmaking business to include making films promoting
“Christian ideas about marriage” by telling stories “through their
films of marriages between one man and one woman that magnify
58. Id. at 2602.
59. Id. at 2607.
60. Opening Brief for Appellants at 5, Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740
(8th Cir. 2019) (No. 17–3352) [hereinafter Appellants’ Brief]. Even the name of
their business, Telescope Media Group, was chosen to reflect the religious vision
of their vocation. “As stated on their business website, the Larsens aim to ‘mag-
nify [God’s] glory the way a telescope magnifies stars’ . . . . This vision impacts
both how the Larsens treat their clients and what stories they choose to tell
through their films.” Id. at 6.
61. Telescope Media, 936 F.3d at 747.
62. Id. at 747–48.
63. Id. at 748.
64. Id.
65. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 60, at 7. This is important for First Amendment
purposes because it demonstrates that expressive vendors are asserting a right to
discriminate against ideas, not persons. See infra notes 176–77 and accompany-
ing text.
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God’s design and purpose for marriage.”66 However, under the Minne-
sota Human Rights Act (MHRA), as interpreted by the State of Minne-
sota, if the Larsens were to make films celebrating opposite-sex
marriage, they would be compelled to make films depicting same-sex
marriage “in an equally ‘positive’ light.”67 Moreover, if the Larsens
should refuse to make films celebrating same-sex marriage, they
would face penalties including “fines, damages awards, and even up to
90 days in jail.”68 Thus, in the concise words of Judge Stras, the ques-
tion before the court was: “Can Minnesota require [the Larsens] to
produce videos of same-sex weddings, even if the message would con-
flict with their own beliefs?”69 Although the Larsens (the appellants)
raised many different constitutional claims in this case, including free
exercise and equal protection, this Article will focus only on the court’s
analysis of the free speech claim under the no-compelled-speech
doctrine.
Basically, this case asked the court to decide whether the MHRA is
a content-neutral regulation of discriminatory conduct, as Minnesota
argued it is,70 or a content-based burden on speech at the core of the
First Amendment, as the appellants argued it is as applied to their
filmmaking business.71 Certainly, on its face the MHRA is a generally
applicable, content-neutral prohibition of discriminatory conduct in
places of public accommodations. It does not mention speech, filmmak-
ing, or storytelling. It simply bans discriminatory practices on the ba-
sis of sexual orientation concerning “the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public ac-
commodation.”72 However, as in Hurley, it was applied to the Larsens’
videography business in “a peculiar way” because it had the effect of
declaring the Larsens’ artistic expression “to be the public
accommodation.”73
Judge Stras, writing for a 2–1 majority, agreed with the Larsens
and stated pointedly that “[s]peech is not conduct just because the
government says it is.”74 Rather than an incidental burden on speech
66. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 60, at 7–8.
67. Telescope Media, 936 F.3d at 748–49; see also Oral Argument at 26:08–27:15, Tel-
escope Media, 936 F.3d 740 (No. 17-3352), http://media-oa.ca8.uscourts.gov/
OAaudio/2018/10/173352.mp3 [https://perma.unl.edu/BC24-NZ74] (explaining
the operation of the MHRA to a hypothetical situation).
68. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 60, at 1.
69. Telescope Media, 936 F.3d. at 747.
70. Id. at 756–57.
71. See id. at 758 (noting that speech compulsions violate a “cardinal constitutional
command” (quoting Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31,
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018))).
72. MINN. STAT. § 363A.11(1)(a)(1) (2019); Telescope Media, 936 F.3d at 748.
73. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 572–73
(1995).
74. Telescope Media, 936 F.3d at 752.
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by a content-neutral law regulating discriminatory conduct, the court
held that Minnesota’s regulation of the Larsens’ wedding videos con-
stituted a content-based75 compulsion of “speech that is entitled to
First Amendment protection.”76 The public accommodations law was
content-based, according to Judge Stras, because it “compels the Lar-
sens to speak favorably about same-sex marriage if they choose to
speak favorably about opposite-sex marriage.”77 It is certainly, at the
very least, content-based. However, as applied to the Larsens, it is
probably best described as viewpoint-based because it compels them to
make films depicting same-sex marriage in a positive light if they
choose to make films depicting marriage between one man and one
woman in a positive light. The law does not merely compel the Lar-
sens to speak generally about the subject of same-sex marriage;
rather, it compels them to express a positive view of same-sex mar-
riage even though that perspective conflicts with their deeply held re-
ligious beliefs about the good of marriage. That is a viewpoint-based
mandate, a particularly egregious form of content-based regulation of
protected speech.78
Telescope Media is a wonderful case through which to view expres-
sive wedding vendors and the no-compelled-speech doctrine because it
features a compelling debate between Judge Stras for the majority
and Judge Kelly in dissent. Judge Stras and Judge Kelly disagreed on
many crucial issues, and it is worthwhile to focus on the analytical
volleys between them. The main issues they debated were speech ver-
sus conduct, content-neutral versus content-based laws, and applica-
tion of the compelling interest test if strict scrutiny applies.
A. Stras Versus Kelly: Regulation of Speech or Conduct?
In her dissent, Judge Kelly viewed the MHRA as a content-neutral
regulation of conduct that only incidentally touched upon speech.79
She supported this conclusion by citing Roberts v. United States
Jaycees,80 a case in which the national organization of the Jaycees ex-
cluded women from membership in violation of—coincidentally—the
MHRA. The Supreme Court held that applying the MHRA against the
Jaycees did not violate their right of expressive association under the
First Amendment, but the Court did so only after deciding that the
Jaycees had discriminated against women as persons and not against
any particular message compelled by application of the MHRA. As the
75. Id. at 758.
76. Id. at 750.
77. Id. at 752.
78. For an extensive discussion of the content-based versus viewpoint-based issue,
see infra section III.B.
79. See Telescope Media, 936 F.3d at 773, 776 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
80. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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Court put it, there was “no basis in the record for concluding that ad-
mission of women as full voting members will impede the organiza-
tion’s ability . . . to disseminate its preferred views.”81 Moreover, the
Court made clear that the MHRA “imposes no restrictions on the or-
ganization’s ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or philoso-
phies different from those of its existing members.”82 There was no
compelled speech at all in the case, just naked discrimination against
admitting women as members of an organization of young business
and community leaders.83
On the speech versus conduct issue, Judge Stras was clear that the
Larsens’ wedding videos are “in a word, speech”84 protected by the
First Amendment because “they intend to shoot, assemble, and edit
the videos with the goal of expressing their own views about the sanc-
tity of marriage.”85 Moreover, it makes no difference that their film-
making and storytelling are produced “through a for-profit
enterprise.”86
Indeed, even the purest of pure speech involves physical move-
ments and activities that could be described as conduct. A fine artist,
such as Rembrandt, must physically stretch his canvas and move his
brush.87 A parade could be deemed conduct because it involves march-
ing and walking down the streets.88 A novelist, such as Dickens, must
sharpen his pencils or move his fingers on a keyboard. Is the creative
process of writing a novel mere unprotected conduct, or protected
speech? Even publishing a newspaper, such as the New York Times,
could be considered conduct “because it depends on the mechanical
operation of a printing press.”89
Thus, Judge Stras concluded that as applied to the Larsens’ crea-
tion of wedding videos, the MHRA is not a mere regulation of commer-
cial conduct, but rather a direct governmental compulsion of artistic
81. Id. at 627.
82. Id.
83. There is no reason to think that women members would in any way restrict the
ability of the Jaycees to speak about business and community issues from its
preferred organizational viewpoint. If there had been any such evidence in the
record, this would have been a very different case. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
84. Telescope Media, 936 F.3d at 751. There is a long line of Supreme Court cases
recognizing that filmmaking and motion pictures are speech protected by the
First Amendment. See id. at 750–51 (citing Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61, 65–66 (1981); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02
(1952)).
85. Id. at 751.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 752.
88. Id.
89. Id.
2020] TELESCOPE MEDIA 71
speech at the core of the First Amendment.90 The governing Supreme
Court precedent is Hurley, not Roberts. Under the Court’s unanimous
decision in Hurley, when a public accommodations law is applied to
compel a wedding videographer to make wedding videos depicting
same-sex weddings in a positive light, it constitutes compelled speech
within the meaning of the First Amendment.91 Judge Stras clearly
won this round of the debate with Judge Kelly.
B. Stras Versus Kelly: Content-Neutral or Content-Based
Law?
Even if wedding videos are some “form of speech protected by the
First Amendment,”92 Judge Kelly argued that the MHRA was a con-
tent-neutral regulation that has only “an incidental effect on some
speakers or messages but not others.”93 Since the general purpose and
effect of the law was to prohibit discriminatory conduct in public ac-
commodations and not to regulate speech, when applied to commercial
wedding video services its effect on speech was only incidental. Thus,
the MHRA is a content-neutral law and its incidental regulation of
protected speech is subject only to intermediate scrutiny.94 Judge
Kelly tried (I think unsuccessfully) to distinguish the parade in Hurley
from the Larsens’ filmmaking by claiming that, by offering their wed-
ding videos as a commercial service, the Larsens had somehow chosen
to subordinate their “own messages to those of their customers.”95
Thus, although the application of the Massachusetts public accommo-
dations law in Hurley “improperly transformed the parade sponsors’
speech into a public accommodation, here it is the Larsens who are
affirmatively declaring their speech to be a public accommodation by
selling their videography services on the open market.”96
However, in both Hurley and Telescope Media, the speakers chose
to bring their expression into a place deemed to be a public accommo-
dation under applicable law. In Hurley, the parade sponsor chose to
offer community groups (but not GLIB) an opportunity to march in a
parade that state law deemed to be a public accommodation; in Tele-
scope Media, the Larsens wished to create wedding videos for tradi-
tional weddings but not for same-sex weddings. In each case the public
accommodations law, as applied to the parade in the one and the wed-
ding videos in the other, has the direct effect of treating speech as a
90. Id. at 751–54.
91. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
92. Telescope Media, 936 F.3d at 771–72 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 772 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
94. Id. at 773 (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623–24 (1984)).
95. Id. at 775.
96. Id.
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public accommodation. In both cases, the law compels unwanted
speech, speech that alters the message the speakers wish to express.
Indeed, the effect on protected speech in Telescope Media is argua-
bly greater and more direct than it was in Hurley. In Hurley, the
parade organizer was merely required to permit GLIB to march in the
parade under its gay pride banner. In Telescope Media, the MHRA
applies to commandeer and conscript the Larsens’ artistic abilities;
the law compels them to create films depicting same-sex marriage in a
positive light, a message that violates their religious conscience about
what they believe is a sacred institution established by God.
Judge Stras criticized the dissent as “a moving target”—as some-
times admitting that “speech is protected, at least in some form,” and
at other times suggesting “that the videos are not speech at all, prima-
rily because the Larsens are telling someone else’s story as part of a
for-profit service.”97 However, as applied to the Larsens’ videography
enterprise, the MHRA not only regulated speech, but it did so “as a
content-based regulation.”98 Just as the speech compulsion in Hurley
interfered with the right of the parade sponsors to shape their own
message, in Telescope Media the MHRA similarly interferes with the
Larsens’ right to speaker autonomy: “By treating the Larsens’ choice
to talk about one topic—opposite-sex marriages—as a trigger for com-
pelling them to talk about a topic they would rather avoid—same-sex
marriages,”99 the MHRA restricts both the Larsens’ right to speak
their own message as well as their right not to create a message that
offends their decent and honorable religious beliefs.100 In other words,
the MHRA unconstitutionally exacts a penalty on the Larsens’ speech
celebrating traditional marriage by compelling them to convey an
equally positive viewpoint about same-sex marriage.101 This results in
a “your money or your life” choice for the Larsens—either express a
message they wish not to express or choose the safe harbor of self-
censorship.102 The First Amendment does not permit this scenario;
speaker autonomy includes both the right to speak and the right not
to speak.
97. Id. at 751 n.3 (majority opinion).




102. Id. at 753–54. As Justice Holmes once put it: “It always is for the interest of a
party under duress to choose the lesser of two evils. But the fact that a choice was
made according to interest does not exclude duress. It is the characteristic of du-
ress properly so called.” Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 248
U.S. 67, 70 (1918), cited in Richard A. Epstein, Linguistic Relativism and the
Decline of the Rule of Law, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 583, 586–87 (2016).
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C. Stras Versus Kelly: Strict Scrutiny/Compelling Interest
Test
As Judge Stras observed, “Laws that compel speech or regulate it
based on its content are subject to strict scrutiny . . . .”103 Under the
jurisprudence of the First Amendment, such a law is presumptively
unconstitutional and the burden is on the State to justify the law by
establishing that it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state
interest.104
For Judge Kelly, this is an easy case. Even if the compelling inter-
est test applies when the MHRA compels the Larsens to make films
depicting same-sex marriage in a positive light, “the MHRA would
survive even strict scrutiny.”105 This is so, she concludes, because “[i]n
general, public accommodations laws further compelling state inter-
ests of eradicating discrimination and ensuring residents have equal
access to publicly available goods and services.”106 Moreover, the law
is narrowly tailored because—here comes the conduct versus speech
argument again—“it targets only conduct, not speech.”107 Like the
legendary cliff swallows who always return to San Juan Capistrano,
Judge Kelly constantly revisits her assertion that the MHRA “regu-
lates only discriminatory conduct.”108 Thus, since the government “is
not forcing them to speak,” there is no need to demonstrate a more
particularized compelling interest to justify a restriction of their free
speech rights.109 Judge Kelly’s First Amendment analysis is wrong
because she gets the facts wrong. Judge Stras hammered that point
home in his majority opinion.
Although Judge Stras conceded that, in general, states have “pow-
erful reasons”110 for prohibiting discriminatory conduct in places of
public accommodations, “[e]ven antidiscrimination laws, as critically
important as they are, must yield to the Constitution.”111 Under the
First Amendment, strict scrutiny requires a more particularized fo-
cus.112 As the unanimous Court in Hurley made abundantly clear,113
103. Telescope Media, 936 F.3d at 754.
104. Id.; see also Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2371 (2018) (reiterating the standard of review for content-based regulations of
speech). If the law regulates or compels speech on the basis of viewpoint, the
standard of review is even stricter. See supra section III.B.
105. Telescope Media, 936 F.3d at 776 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 777 (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
107. Id. at 778.
108. Id. at 777.
109. Id. at 778.
110. Id. at 754 (majority opinion).
111. Id. at 755.
112. As Professor Douglas Laycock notes, a general governmental interest in nondis-
crimination is not sufficient under strict scrutiny. The proper inquiry “is whether
enforcement of the government’s interest as applied to the particular religious
claimant—and to all others whose similar claims cannot be fairly distinguished—
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“regulating speech because it is discriminatory or offensive is not a
compelling state interest.”114
At the end of the day, Telescope Media stands for the principle that
under the First Amendment, “antidiscrimination laws can regulate
conduct, but not expression.”115 It would seem as though this reason-
ing applies not only to commercial videographers, but also to other
expressive businesses such as photographers, fine artists, printers,
musical performers, and perhaps even to cake artists and floral
arrangers.
Judge Stras is correct; even antidiscrimination laws must “yield” to
the First Amendment.116
IV. DEFENDING THE REASONING OF TELESCOPE MEDIA’S
COMPELLED SPEECH DECISION
The majority opinion in Telescope Media has become the leading
federal decision on the no-compelled-speech doctrine as applied to ex-
pressive wedding vendors. Although the majority opinion written by
Judge Stras is very persuasive, many commentators do not agree. I
believe Judge Stras is right and the commentators are wrong. In this
Part of the Article, I hope to demonstrate why the critics are wrong
and Judge Stras is right.
In a forthcoming chapter of a book on the wedding vendor issue,
Professor Daniel Conkle argues that the compelled speech claims of
expressive wedding vendors should be rejected by the courts.117 Pro-
fessor Conkle makes three main arguments in support of this
conclusion.
First, Conkle suggests that even if a wedding vendor provides a
service that is sufficiently expressive to be under the general protec-
tion of the Free Speech Clause, “the compelled speech argument
hinges on a more narrow issue: does the vendor’s expressive conduct
in fact convey, to a reasonable observer, the message to which the ven-
dor objects, that is, does it convey his or her personal approval and
is necessary to serve a compelling government interest.” Douglas Laycock, Relig-
ious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 872 (citing Gonzales
v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430–31 (2006)).
113. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
114. Telescope Media, 936 F.3d at 755.
115. Id. at 756.
116. Id. at 755.
117. Daniel O. Conkle, Equality, Animus, and Expressive and Religious Freedom
Under the American Constitution: Masterpiece Cakeshop and Beyond, in LA
LIBERTÉ D’EXPRESSION EN DROIT COMPARÉ [FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN COMPARA-
TIVE LAW] (Gilles J. Guglielmi ed., Les Editions Panthéon-Assas, forthcoming
2020) (manuscript at 23–24), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3417932 [https://perma.unl.edu/Y89K-7VHV].
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endorsement of the same-sex wedding?”118 He suggests the answer to
this question is no and that, therefore, there is no compelled speech
claim involved when a wedding vendor is required to accept work cele-
brating same-sex weddings.119 Second, Conkle argues that the no-
compelled-speech doctrine is not implicated because antidiscrimina-
tion laws do not target “the vendor’s conduct in order to dictate its
expressive content or to require the vendor to communicate a message
of the government’s choosing.”120 In other words, public accommoda-
tions laws are content-neutral regulations of conduct “and therefore
should not trigger free speech strict scrutiny.”121 Finally, he argues
that even if strict scrutiny applies, public accommodations laws are
justified because they satisfy the compelling interest test.122 Although
Conkle was not writing about Telescope Media, his reasoning is almost
identical to that of Judge Kelly’s dissent in the case. This Part of the
Article will now evaluate each of Professor Conkle’s arguments.
A. The No-Compelled-Speech Doctrine Applies when “A” Is
Compelled to Speak, Create, or Help Disseminate the
Message of “B”
Professor Conkle seems to believe that, under public accommoda-
tions laws, religiously-motivated expression by a for-profit business
should be protected—if at all—only under the Free Exercise Clause
and not by the Free Speech Clause.123 However, the Court’s free
speech jurisprudence clearly “establishes that private religious
speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully pro-
tected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression.”124
Indeed, in the memorable words of Justice Scalia, “a free-speech
clause without religion would be Hamlet without the prince.”125 More-
over, as Judge Stras noted in Telescope Media, it makes no difference
that the regulated speech is part of a for-profit business.126
118. Id. (manuscript at 23). In her dissent in Telescope Media, Judge Kelly makes this
argument as well. See Telescope Media, 936 F.3d at 773; see also Steven H. Shif-
frin, What is Wrong with Compelled Speech?, 29 J.L. & POL. 499, 506–07 (2014)
(arguing that a wedding photographer is not objectively endorsing the ceremony).
119. Conkle, supra note 117.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (manuscript at 24).
123. See id. (manuscript at 3).
124. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995).
125. Id.
126. Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 751 (8th Cir. 2019); see, e.g., Citi-
zens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (collecting First Amendment
caselaw); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964) (holding a for-profit
newspaper’s paid commercial advertisement is protected speech). Specifically, the
fact that motion pictures and films are made and sold for profit “does not prevent
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Under Wooley and Hurley, it is abundantly clear that the no-com-
pelled-speech doctrine does not require a showing that a reasonable
observer would understand the compelled message as the personal ex-
pression of the compelled speaker. The doctrine is triggered when a
law usurps speaker autonomy by compelling speech. When A is com-
pelled to help disseminate either the message of the government or
the message of a third person, even under circumstances in which it is
apparent that A is acting merely as messenger or a “billboard,” the no-
compelled-speech doctrine applies.
Wooley v. Maynard127 is conclusive on this point. Recall that in
Wooley the State of New Hampshire had prosecuted Mr. Maynard for
using tape to cover the state motto (“Live Free or Die”) on his license
plate.128 No reasonable observer would have mistaken the state motto
on an automobile license plate as conveying the endorsement or ap-
proval of the automobile’s owner or driver. It was clearly the State’s
speech and clearly not Mr. Maynard’s speech. Nevertheless, the Court
held that New Hampshire had violated the First Amendment by com-
pelling Mr. Maynard to act as a “mobile billboard” for the State’s ideo-
logical message.129 It would not have made a difference if New
Hampshire had allowed a third person, perhaps Mr. Maynard’s next-
door neighbor, to write the slogan for Maynard’s license plate. Under
Wooley and Hurley, government may not compel any individual to
help disseminate any ideological message.130
In Telescope Media,131 the Larsens had a far stronger case than
Mr. Maynard had in Wooley. Maynard was only required to register
his automobile and drive it about with the unobscured state motto on
his license plate. He was merely a passive messenger, not a compelled
speaker or creator of the message. The Larsens, however, are required
to actually create films with ideas and messages that contradict their
reasonable and honorable religious beliefs about what marriage is and
what it is not. If they make films portraying traditional marriage in a
positive light, they are compelled by law to make films depicting
same-sex marriage in an equally positive light.132 This clearly violates
the no-compelled-speech doctrine, even if no reasonable observer
would view the Larsens’ compelled films as expressing their personal
approval of same-sex marriage.
them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First
Amendment.” Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952).
127. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
128. Id. at 707–08; see also supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text (elaborating on
the facts of Wooley).
129. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715; see also supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text (elab-
orating on the facts of Wooley).
130. See supra notes 38–47 and accompanying text.
131. Telescope Media, 936 F.3d 740.
132. Id. at 752.
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B. Compelled Speech Under Public Accommodation Laws Is
Usually Viewpoint-Based, and Certainly Not
Content-Neutral
In almost every compelled speech case, including Telescope Media
and Masterpiece Cakeshop,133 the speech compulsion is not content-
neutral. Indeed, not only are these speech mandates content-based,
they are usually viewpoint-based. Professor Conkle is simply wrong
when he argues that when enforcing these laws against expressive
wedding vendors, the government is regulating only discriminatory
conduct and is not “dictat[ing] [the] expressive content” of the wedding
vendor’s speech.134
Again, the Court’s unanimous opinion in Hurley is the key prece-
dent. When a public accommodations law is applied in such a way as
to treat a vendor’s speech as a public accommodation, the result will
almost always be at least a content-based speech mandate. In Hurley,
the parade sponsors were required to allow a group to march under a
banner expressing a message of gay pride.135 Was this speech man-
date content-neutral, content-based, or viewpoint-based?
A content-neutral restriction is one in which the law is designed to
regulate some non-speech interest—such as excessive noise—and only
incidentally restricts speech. A law prohibiting all excessive noise on
residential streets after ten o’clock at night is an example of a content-
neutral time, place, or manner regulation. If it is enforced evenhand-
edly against all loud protests and speakers after ten, its effect on
speech is merely incidental. This law is almost certainly constitutional
under cases like Frisby v. Schultz.136
A content-based mandate might be one in which the law requires a
speaker to express an opinion—any opinion—on a particular subject.
For example, the law might compel a speaker to say something—any-
thing she wishes—about same-sex marriage. That law is a content-
based speech compulsion and is therefore presumptively unconstitu-
tional unless the government can demonstrate it is narrowly tailored
and serves a compelling state interest.137
133. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
134. Conkle, supra note 117. In her dissent in Telescope Media, Judge Kelly makes
this argument as well. See Telescope Media, 936 F.3d at 774; see also Shiffrin,
supra note 118, at 503 (describing similar New Mexico Supreme Court decision
relating to a photographer).
135. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
572–74 (1995).
136. 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (holding that content-neutral time, place, or manner
rules will be upheld so long as they are narrowly-tailored to serve a significant—
but not necessarily compelling—government interest).
137. Telescope Media, 936 F.3d at 754; see, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates
v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018).
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But now suppose, as in Telescope Media, that a public accommoda-
tions law not only treats wedding videography as a public accommoda-
tion, but requires the filmmaker to create films depicting same-sex
marriage in a positive light.138 This, I think, is a viewpoint-based re-
quirement, a particularly egregious form of content-based regula-
tion.139 In other words, viewpoint-based mandates are laws that
compel an unwilling speaker to express a message that takes a partic-
ular ideological position on a particular subject. If the subject is same-
sex marriage and the requirement is to depict same-sex marriage in a
positive light, the requirement is viewpoint-based. Therefore, the com-
pelled gay pride message in Hurley and the compelled positive mes-
sage about same-sex marriage in Telescope Media are viewpoint-based
mandates.140
The Court has never upheld a law imposing a viewpoint-based re-
striction on free speech.141 Indeed, in the words of Justice Alito,
“Viewpoint discrimination is poison to a free society.”142 Thus, al-
though the Court has never clearly said so, “as a practical matter,
there is a per se rule against viewpoint discrimination.”143 As Justice
Alito suggests, the idea is that in a free society it is never appropriate
for government to restrict speech on the basis of viewpoint or enact
viewpoint-based speech compulsions. In other words, viewpoint dis-
crimination “is so inconsistent with First Amendment values that it
would not even qualify as a legitimate interest capable of satisfying
the lowest level of judicial scrutiny.”144
The bottom line is that in compelled speech cases involving expres-
sive wedding vendors, whether they are wedding photographers, vide-
ographers, printers, graphic designers, or cake artists, when a public
138. 936 F.3d at 748–49.
139. Although a content-based restriction of speech is a grievous First Amendment
problem, viewpoint-based discrimination by government is a “more blatant” and
“egregious form of content discrimination.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). Thus, when the government compels a
private individual to express a particular ideological message or creed, as in Hur-
ley and Telescope Media, it is an egregious viewpoint-based wrong under the First
Amendment.
140. Justice Kennedy has defined the test for viewpoint discrimination as “whether—
within the relevant subject category—the government has singled out a subset of
messages for disfavor based on the views expressed.” Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct.
1744, 1766 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (noting racially disparaging trademarks are protected by the Free Speech
Clause).
141. See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Rise of the Viewpoint-Discrimination Principle,
72 SMU L. REV. F. 20, 35 (2019).
142. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring); see also
Bloom, supra note 141, at 36 (“In Iancu, Justice Kagan assumed that proof of
viewpoint discrimination resulted in automatic invalidation of the law.”).
143. Bloom, supra note 141, at 35.
144. Id. at 36.
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accommodations law compels them to create messages or artistic ex-
pression celebrating same-sex weddings, the result will inevitably be
at least a content-based—and probably a viewpoint-based—speech
mandate. If the mandate is content-based, the State will be required
to demonstrate that, as applied specifically to the vendor’s expressive
enterprise, the mandate is narrowly tailored to advance a compel-
lingly important state interest. If the mandate is viewpoint-based, it
will be reviewed under what amounts to a categorical rule of unconsti-
tutionality. Wedding vendors should always—or almost always—pre-
vail in these cases.
C. Herein of Compelling Interests and Relative Harms
Professor Conkle argues that even when a wedding vendor is sub-
ject to a content-based speech mandate, his free speech claim must fail
because the government “can satisfy even strict scrutiny.”145 Of
course, if the compelled speech is viewpoint-based, the wedding ven-
dor should prevail under the categorical rule that views viewpoint dis-
crimination as poisonous to a free society.146
Assuming strict scrutiny applies, the question becomes: What is
the compelling government interest advanced when the antidis-
crimination law is applied to treat a vendor’s speech as the public ac-
commodation? As Conkle admits, “disadvantaged couples generally
will be able to obtain the same goods or services elsewhere with mini-
mal inconvenience and little if any tangible injury.”147 But even if
there is no serious economic or tangible harm resulting from a wed-
ding vendor’s exercise of his right not to speak, Conkle argues that
same-sex couples suffer a much more serious harm—“the indignity of
being denied goods or service by a commercial business that serves the
general public.”148 If Conkle’s argument is persuasive, not even the
Bill of Rights and the First Amendment protect a wedding vendor’s
right to decline to create expressions celebrating same-sex weddings.
Some commentators argue that the First Amendment should not
be construed to protect free speech or religious liberty that causes
harm to third parties.149 Like Professor Conkle, these scholars “view
discrimination, and its attendant ‘dignity harm’ as a particularly sali-
ent form of cognizable harm.”150
145. Conkle, supra note 117 (manuscript at 24).
146. See supra notes 141–44 and accompanying text.
147. Conkle, supra note 117 (manuscript at 28–29).
148. Id. (manuscript at 29).
149. See generally Stephanie H. Barclay, First Amendment “Harms,” 95 IND. L.J.
(forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3385311 [https://perma.unl.edu/WCV3-LY5K].
150. Id. (manuscript at 21); see Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommo-
dations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619,
644–49 (2015).
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Certainly, dignitary harm is real harm; the kind of harm often
caused by speech that deeply offends persons who take issue with the
speech, or with a refusal to speak as in the wedding vendor cases.
Some commentators argue that the dignitary harm is even more se-
vere when the objection to providing the service is based upon a relig-
ious belief that the customer’s conduct is sinful.151 However, the
Court has repeatedly held that, under the Free Speech Clause,
“[p]reventing offense, preventing emotional harm, or preventing in-
sult”152 does not justify content- or viewpoint-based restrictions or
compulsions of speech.
Consider, for example, Snyder v. Phelps,153 a case in which the
Court held, in an 8–1 decision, that not even the most vile and disgust-
ing hate speech can be the basis of liability for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The Court, in an opinion by Chief Jus-
tice Roberts, made clear that offensive and emotionally disturbing
speech is constitutionally protected: “If there is a bedrock principle un-
derlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not pro-
hibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable.”154 Even more clearly, in Matal v.
Tam,155 the Court unanimously held that hate speech and offensive
speech are protected by the Free Speech Clause, and Justice Alito ex-
plained why the Free Speech Clause cannot give in to the argument
that offensive speech is not protected:
But no matter how the point is phrased, its unmistakable thrust is this: The
Government has an interest in preventing speech expressing ideas that of-
fend. And, as we have explained, that idea strikes at the heart of the First
Amendment. Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, re-
ligion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest
boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to ex-
press “the thought that we hate.”156
Moreover, what if the “do no harm principle” were applied evenhand-
edly to take account of the harm caused on both sides in cases like
Telescope Media? If religious speech must be suppressed when it
causes harm to gay couples, should public accommodations laws be
suppressed when they cause harm to wedding vendors?
151. See Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Con-
science Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2577 (2015) (arguing
that a religious belief that certain conduct is sinful expresses a particularly
harmful “social meaning”).
152. Douglas Laycock, The Wedding-Vendor Cases, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 65
(2018).
153. 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
154. Id. at 458 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
155. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (holding that disparaging trademarks are protected by the
Free Speech Clause).
156. Id. at 1764 (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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As Professor Stephanie H. Barclay explains, “[S]omeone will al-
ways experience a cost or harm when government acts to protect, or
not protect, any constitutional right.”157 Therefore, she argues that
“we must broaden our lens to observe harms on both sides of the
scale.”158 If we look at the harms on both sides, it seems clear that in
most cases the scales will tip in favor of protecting wedding vendors
such as the Larsens. Although their customers can easily obtain vide-
ography services from other nearby businesses in the marketplace, the
Larsens will be forced by government to choose between their religious
conscience and their livelihood.159 As Professor Richard Epstein puts
it, “The ability to attribute coercive behavior to the victims of coercion
is one dire consequence of [a] massive breakdown in the English lan-
guage.”160 In other words, the Larsens are the victims—not the perpe-
trators—of coercive harm.161
The Larsens also suffer severe dignitary harm to their religious
identity when the government uses the force of law to treat them like
outlaws merely for their conscientious decision not to speak. Under
the MHRA, they are being compelled to create films with messages
and ideas they believe are untrue to the institution of marriage as God
has ordained it. They are being forced “to defy God’s will—to disrupt
the most important relationship in their lives,” and to commit a “seri-
ous wrong that will torment their conscience for a long time thereaf-
ter.”162 In terms of relative harm, the harm caused to the Larsens by
the MHRA “is permanent loss of [religious] identity or permanent loss
of occupation, and that far outweighs the one-time dignitary or insult
harm on the couple’s side.”163
D. The Race Analogy Does Not Apply to Wedding Vendors
and Compelled Speech Cases
A final contention by the dissent in Telescope Media, one that often
arises in wedding vendor cases, is the argument that the Larsens re-
fusal to create videos celebrating same-sex weddings is morally and
legally equivalent to racial discrimination by restaurants during the
157. Barclay, supra note 149 (manuscript at 62).
158. Id.
159. See Epstein, supra note 102, at 586 (noting that the state forces wedding vendors
“by fines, injunctions, or imprisonment” to choose between their religious con-
science and their business).
160. Id. at 585–86.
161. Refusing to serve a customer in a competitive market is not coercive in the same
way that the fines and even criminal sanctions of public accommodations laws
are. Id. at 586. As Epstein puts it, “[A] world with multiple alternatives is always
less coercive than a world with only one.” Id.
162. Laycock, supra note 152.
163. Id.
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Jim Crow era.164 But this analogy completely disregards Justice Ken-
nedy’s promise in Obergefell not to disparage the “decent and honora-
ble religious or philosophical premises”165 of those who, like the
Larsens, are conscientiously opposed to expressing or creating
messages that celebrate same-sex marriage. The owners of segregated
restaurants, such as those in Piggie Park, were acting on the indecent
and dishonorable bigotry of white supremacy. Deeply religious wed-
ding vendors, such as the Larsens in Telescope Media and Jack Phil-
lips in Masterpiece Cakeshop, are standing on reasonable, decent, and
honorable principles of religious conscience.
As Professor Andrew Koppelman observes, one of the goals of an-
tidiscrimination laws protecting gay persons is to transform the cul-
ture in order to create a society in which “prejudice against gays is
despised in the same way as racism.”166 This purpose of gay rights
laws, says Koppelman, “is the most fundamental source of the conflict
between gay rights and religious liberty.”167 If we value free speech
and religious liberty as fundamental natural rights,168 it is imperative
that we push back against this purpose to stigmatize decent and hon-
orable religious beliefs about what marriage is and what it is not. To
the extent public accommodations laws are designed to stigmatize and
marginalize traditional religious beliefs about marriage and sin, not
only is it not a compellingly important interest, it is not even a legiti-
mate state interest. It is tyrannical to use the force of law to compel
wedding vendors to create messages expressing ideas they believe are
untrue to their deepest beliefs about the good life. The Larsens and
similar religious wedding vendors are not asking courts to protect
their right to “discriminate” against same-sex customers. Rather, they
164. Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 777 (8th Cir. 2019) (Kelly, J., dis-
senting) (“If eradicating discrimination based on race or sex is a compelling state
interest, then so is Minnesota’s interest in eradicating discrimination based on
sexual orientation.”); see also Conkle, supra note 117 (manuscript at 29–30) (not-
ing the Supreme Court’s finding of a compelling state interest in Newman v. Pig-
gie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402–03 n.5 (1968) (per curiam), a racial
discrimination case involving a chain of restaurants and drive-ins that refused to
serve African-Americans, and arguing that the government also “has a compel-
ling justification for rejecting religious exemptions” in cases involving discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientaion).
165. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015); supra notes 57–59 and accom-
panying text.
166. Koppelman, supra note 150, at 649.
167. Id.
168. Free speech and religious liberty are fundamental human rights “grounded in the
‘inherent dignity’ [of] every person.” Richard W. Garnett, Religious Accommoda-
tions and—and Among—Civil Rights: Separation, Toleration, and Accommoda-
tion, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 494 (2015). The conflict between gay rights and First
Amendment freedoms is, therefore, a “tension . . . among civil rights claims.” Id.
at 500.
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are “asserting [their] civil liberty against state coercion in the form of
compelled speech.”169
Moreover, as Professor Douglas Laycock has said, it “is absurd”170
to compare a handful of wedding vendor cases to the “monolithic
southern-white support for subordinating African-Americans”171 that
resulted in a vile system of racial apartheid prior to enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. As Ryan T. Anderson notes:
Before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, racial segregation was
rampant and entrenched, and African Americans were treated as second-class
citizens. Individuals, businesses, and associations across the country excluded
blacks in ways that caused grave material and social harms without justifica-
tion, without market forces acting as a corrective, and with the government’s
tacit and often explicit backing.172
It also is clear that “[o]pposition to interracial marriage developed as
one aspect of [this] larger system of racism and white supremacy.”173
Indeed, in Loving v. Virginia,174 the Court’s landmark decision strik-
ing down Virginia’s laws prohibiting interracial marriages, Chief Jus-
tice Warren explicitly noted that these laws were based upon “the
doctrine of White Supremacy.”175
However, as in Telescope Media,176 wedding vendors who decline
to create messages celebrating same-sex marriage do not discriminate
against customers who identify as gay, but rather assert, based upon
their decent and honorable religious belief, “that marriage is the
union of husband and wife.”177 This is critically important for First
Amendment purposes because even if state public accommodations
laws treat same-sex marriage discrimination as discrimination
against gay persons, this reasoning should not apply to free speech
analysis. The First Amendment allows speakers to discriminate in
favor of messages they wish to express and against messages they
169. Erica Goldberg, “Good Orthodoxy” and the Legacy of Barnette, 13 FIU L. REV.
639, 648 (2019).
170. Laycock, supra note 8, at 190.
171. Id. at 191.
172. Ryan T. Anderson, Disagreement Is Not Always Discrimination: On Masterpiece
Cakeshop and the Analogy to Interracial Marriage, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
123, 131 (2018).
173. Id. at 125.
174. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
175. Id. at 7; see also LUKE GOODRICH, FREE TO BELIEVE: THE BATTLE OVER RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY IN AMERICA 126–30 (2019) (noting the race analogy is not persuasive).
176. See supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text.
177. Anderson, supra note 172, at 130. “That view of marriage is based on the capacity
that a man and woman possess to unite in a conjugal act, create new life, and
unite that new life with both a mother and a father. Whether ultimately sound or
not, this view of marriage is reasonable, is based on decent and honorable prem-
ises, and disparages no one.” Id. at 125. See also Laycock, supra note 152, at 63
(“[Wedding vendors] are not singling out gays and lesbians; they are singling out
weddings.”).
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wish not to express. That was clearly the case in Telescope Media, and
Judge Stras was correct to decide the case on that foundation.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the no-compelled-speech doctrine, government may not com-
pel anyone to speak or even to help disseminate any religious, politi-
cal, or ideological message or idea. It applies to all speakers, artists,
videographers, photographers, printers, and expressive enterprises.
There is no reason to think that it does not apply to wedding vendors
when they decline to create or help disseminate a message celebrating
same-sex marriage.
The issue before the Eighth Circuit in Telescope Media was not
whether same-sex couples “can have a wedding with the full pano-
ply”178 of wedding services, including wedding videography services.
All of these goods and services are available to them in the market-
place. Rather, the issue in Telescope Media was whether Minnesota
may compel the Larsens to create films depicting same-sex weddings
in a positive light despite their decent and honorable religious beliefs
about what marriage is and what it is not.179
In a very persuasive majority opinion by Judge Stras, the Eighth
Circuit held that commercial wedding videos are speech protected by
the Free Speech Clause.180 Moreover, when a wedding videographer is
compelled by law to create films depicting same-sex weddings in a pos-
itive light, the government is guilty of (at the very least) a content-
based speech compulsion.181 Finally, the court held that Minnesota
did not have a compelling state interest sufficient to justify such a
content-based speech mandate.182 Therefore, as Judge Stras put it so
pointedly, “Even antidiscrimination laws, as critically important as
they are, must yield to the Constitution.”183
The Supreme Court has a long and distinguished jurisprudence
protecting the right of individuals not to be compelled to speak. This
Article has attempted to demonstrate that in Telescope Media, the
Eighth Circuit properly applied the Supreme Court’s no-compelled-
speech jurisprudence.
In Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell’s classic novel of a dys-
topian state in which the Party and the Thought Police control all
speech and thought, the protagonist, a man named Winston, says this:
“Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four. If that is
178. Laycock, supra note 112, at 877.
179. Id. (“The issue is whether the religious conscientious objector must be the one
who provides these things.”).
180. See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text.
183. Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 755 (8th Cir. 2019).
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granted, all else follows.”184 In other words, intellectual autonomy
consists of the freedom to say what you think is true and to not say
what you think is untrue. Only a tyrannical government requires one
to say that which he believes is not true—to say two plus two make
five. In Telescope Media, the court recognized this powerful insight
about the heart and soul of freedom of thought and freedom of speech.
Under the no-compelled-speech doctrine, Minnesota may not compel
the Larsens—or anyone else—to speak, create, or help disseminate
ideas with which they disagree.
State laws—even state laws governing very important state inter-
ests—must yield to the Constitution. State laws defining marriage
must yield to the Due Process Clause.185 State laws regulating the
curriculum for public schools must yield to the Establishment
Clause.186 And, yes, public accommodations laws compelling speech
must yield to the Free Speech Clause.187 Judge Stras’s powerful opin-
ion in Telescope Media gets the caselaw right, and more importantly,
it gets the First Amendment right. It is now the leading case on wed-
ding vendors and compelled speech, and this preeminent status is
well-deserved.
184. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 81 (1949).
185. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (recognizing same-sex marriage).
186. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down “creation science”
curriculum).
187. Telescope Media, 936 F.3d at 755.
